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November 17, 1956

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

The Reoccupation of Suez

AN EDITORIAL

Suez—Action Short of Nuclear War

F. A. VOIGT

Retire—On What?

KARL E. ETTINGER

Articles and Reviews by WILLMOORE KENDALL
GUY PONCE DE LEON • REVILO OLIVER • WM. F. BUCKLEY, JR.
L. BRENT BOZELL • JAMES BURNHAM • WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM

— For the Record —

Governor Christian Herter of Massachusetts (Stassen's "light that failed") has the inside track to replace John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, according to well-placed Republican sources. They give Herter a better chance than either Thomas E. Dewey or U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge.

Jacob Javits' victory in New York State (he trailed President Eisenhower by more than one million votes) is being interpreted as a vote of no confidence in Mr. Javits by the conservative Republicans who opposed his nomination. Analysis of the ballot shows that 500,000 New Yorkers who voted for Eisenhower also voted for Democratic candidate Robert Wagner. Another 100,000 Eisenhower supporters failed to vote for either Javits or Wagner.... The last minute drive to get a large write-in vote for General Douglas MacArthur apparently ran aground on the complicated mechanics of the write-in in New York voting machines. MacArthur officials have protested to the State Election Funds Bureau the alleged refusal of polling officials to instruct voters how to cast write-in ballots.

In Connecticut, Independent Republican Suzanne Silvercruys Stevenson (running in opposition to Prescott Bush) racked up only 6,000 votes, far fewer than anticipated and not enough to keep the Independent Republican ticket on the ballot in 1960. But 20,000 persons refused to vote for any senatorial candidate and another 73,000 who voted for Eisenhower crossed party lines to cast their senatorial ballots for Democratic candidate Thomas Dodd.

T. Coleman Andrews' States' Rights ticket ran far below expectations in Virginia where it had been predicted it might receive as many as 150,000 votes. (It got 40,000—or 7 per cent)... But Andrews and Werdel showed up better than predicted in Louisiana (7 per cent of the vote) and in Alabama and Mississippi.... The Negro vote is credited, to a large extent, with swinging Louisiana into the Republican column for the first time since 1876.

Twenty-four hours before the election, the Yale Co-op (Bookstore) submitted copy for an advertisement in the Yale Daily News. The Ad: Notice of a big sale. The price of all books by Stevenson slashed 50 per cent. . . . A victim of the 1956 televised election: the traditional Times Square crowd. At the height of the election "excitement," there were only 1,000 persons watching results along the Great White Way.

The countries engaged in the Middle-Eastern fighting—Great Britain, France, Egypt and Israel—between them have received more than \$13 billion of U.S. aid since World War Two. . . . Approximately half of Middle-Eastern oil production has been cut off since the Israeli invasion of Egypt, according to oil sources. . . . The Administration plan to supply France and Great Britain with oil (drawn up right after Egypt seized the Suez Canal) has been pigeonholed pending a settlement of the present hot-war situation. . . . Freight rates have gone up by 15 per cent on all ships diverted from the Suez.

It's all in how you see it: Within a single week, Indonesian president Sukarno 1) bitterly assailed the Israeli and Franco-British invasions of Egypt; 2) refused to make any statement about Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolt ("reports from Budapest are too vague to be used as a basis for stating the position of Indonesia"); and 3) demanded the "burial" (suppression) of all Indonesian political parties because their "creation in 1945 was a great mistake."

Erich Ollenhauer, chief of the neutralist German Social Democratic Party, plans a political prospecting trip to the United States in the near future in an attempt to offset Chancellor Adenauer's popularity here prior to West Germany's 1957 elections. . . . Juscelino Kubitschek did not even wait for the Brazilian Congress to adopt a proposed censorship law before acting against the newspaper and magazine owned by Carlos Lacerdo. Lacerdo has charged that Kubitschek's regime is involved with Communists and with corrupt elements of the old Vargas gang.

NATIONAL REVIEW

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

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The WEEK

● Richard Nixon has driven Max Lerner, *New York Post* columnist and self-proclaimed atheist, to prayer. Mr. Lerner concludes his post-election lament by pledging, "I hereby serve notice that during the next four years I shall pray every night for the health and strength and life of the President of the United States." On top of everything else, Mr. Eisenhower can now be called the Instrument of the Lord.

● Even in bitter defeat, Democratic leaders are exemplifying the copybook virtues. In the case of Mrs. Roosevelt, generosity: it is important, she proclaimed—though if our memory serves us she didn't learn this from her husband, who lost only to foreign politicians—"to be a good loser as well as a good winner." In the case of Senator Kefauver, stick-to-it-iveness: his palm still wet from shaking hands for Stevenson, he began, with hardly a pause, shaking hands for Kefauver in 1960.

● From the time of the first attacks by Soviet tanks on Hungarians, it took Jawaharlal Nehru, well-known moral preceptor to mankind, exactly thirteen days to express a word of disapproval.

● With the election behind us, Americans will begin steaming off the neon-bright stickers that have disfigured their cars since August, and easing off the buttons (or silver shoes) that have torn their lapels. But lovers of the United Auto Workers have only just begun to wear their hearts on their sleeves. Expecting to "flood the country," the boycott co-ordinator has ordered, in bulk, ties of scroll design on which is emblazoned, "Support Kohler Boycott" (\$1.50), T-shirts stamped with "Boycott Kohler—Win The Strike," (\$1.00), and caps to match. It seems to us that pro-Kohlerites who do not need plumbing could at the very least go and get tattooed with some counterpart statement backing the Kohler campaign.

● The *New Republic's* Gerald Johnson has come up with an interesting bit of speculation. 1) The kidnapper of the Weinberger baby was an out-of-work installment buyer who 2) could not face the prospect of having to return his purchases, and therefore 3) turned to kidnapping. Now, it happens that 63 per cent of our population buys on time, and many are behind on their payments . . . Their reactions under this pressure may explain "many things" in American life—"perhaps even," Mr. Johnson adds, "such apparently unrelated phenomena as McCarran, Mc-

Carthy, and the Bricker Amendment." Who advocates Point Four, neutralism and collectivism can be assumed to be a cash-and-carry consumer.

● On October 27, NATIONAL REVIEW endorsed a number of senatorial candidates. Herewith their fate: *Elected*: Everett Dirksen, Illinois; Homer Capehart, Indiana; Bourke Hickenlooper, Iowa; Frank Carlson, Kansas; John Butler, Maryland; Norris Cotton, New Hampshire; Francis Case, South Dakota; Wallace Bennett, Utah. *Defeated*: Suzanne Stevenson, Connecticut; Douglas McKay, Oregon (by Wayne Morse); and Herman Welker, Idaho (by Frank Church). To the winners, we offer our congratulations; to the losers, our sincere sympathy.

● We belong to that select 99 per cent of living adult Americans who like law and order but *don't* like a cop. So we were pleased as punch over the recent story of a policeman who gave a motorist a fifteen-dollar ticket for speeding, carelessly dropped the carbon copy on the pavement, failed to notice when the motorist recovered it, and himself ended up with a twenty-five-dollar fine for littering the streets. *Fiat justitia ruat caelum*.

Who Says They Didn't Die in Vain?

Buried almost out of sight on election day last week was the answer suggested by Senator William Knowland to the Soviet Union's massacre of Hungary. Senator Knowland called for: 1) A world-wide condemnation of the Soviet Union as an aggressor. 2) The expulsion of the Soviet Union from the United Nations. 3) The application of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union and its allies. 4) Withdrawal of diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union. And 5) the organization of an international, military volunteer "crusade for freedom," dedicated to driving the troops of the Soviet Union from Hungary.

Senator Knowland's was one voice, but it sang out above the American political chorus that met this most grievous affront on humanity with extensive and wordy requiems, and nothing, literally nothing more. Is Senator Knowland the only man in American politics who grasps the fact that the Communist mind is not reached by appeals to reason, or his heart touched by appeals to compassion; that even a lead editorial in the *New York Times* will not deter the Soviet Union from its absorbing preoccupation with stamping out freedom wherever in the world it presumes to exist? Tens of thousands of Hungarian martyrs *have* died in vain, it appears, for in the Western mind, and in the Western stomach, there is not

the resolution or the will to resist; over their graves, there is nothing being pledged but parliamentary expressions of distaste; as to deeds, there are none. There is only submission.

We wish a national moratorium could be declared on verbal and written criticism of Communism and Communists. We wish that every politician, every orator, every editorial writer, every preacher would, one morning, stop deploring any act of the Soviet Union, or aspect of Communism. In the sudden stillness, we would realize how empty has been our "opposition" to Communism, for in that stillness we would hear, in dreadful clarity, only the bustling wheels of normalcy, and know the absence of any meaningful act of resistance; and, without the solace of our rhetoric, we might be ashamed.


The Reoccupation of Suez

1. The British and French Choose to Survive

In the first hours after the British and French announced their ultimatum, many Americans, and virtually all Liberals, worked themselves up into a state of indignation unmatched since the days when they were provoked, at every turn, by Senator McCarthy. Our surprise at the Anglo-French move was understandable: we had gradually come to think that military action, of any kind, and under any circumstances, was unthinkable—especially military action originating with the West. Momentary shock is one thing. Our failure, in the light of events, to understand, *and sympathize with* the Anglo-French move is another; for such a failure reveals either a dogged naiveté about the strategical requirements for the survival of the nations of Western Europe, or a bitter-end pacifism that could lead us to catastrophe and final defeat.

The Suez situation is best understood by subtracting from it, in preliminary analysis, the role—indeed the very existence—of Israel. For the Anglo-French move was not, in the immediate sense, influenced by the fact of Israel. It was brought on by the fact of Nasser, and the fact of the Soviet Union, and the fact of the Suez Canal.

Arguments about Nasser cannot be terminated by simply asserting that it is the business of Egyptians whom they shall set at the head of their government. Those who insist that the collision in Suez involves merely the pressures of national self-determination on the one hand, and the pressures of antique colonialism on the other, are refusing to examine precisely those distinctive factors of the situation that caused Britain and France—two nations notoriously pacific since the ending of the second world war, and almost infinitely accommodating toward nationalist crav-



ings—to face down hysterical international disapproval, and pull the trigger.

The British and the French saw the turn that Egypt and the Middle East were taking, led on by Nasser; they saw, and understood, the consequences. They saw that Nasser's ravenous ambition and unbounded unscrupulousness were driving him into the hands of the Soviet Union; they saw that the appeal of his strutting lawlessness was proving irresistible to primitive Arab nationalism. In no country of the Middle East was it any longer politically possible to differ with Nasser; for, having humbled the West, he had emerged the popular, dragon-slaying hero of the Arab masses.

The leaders of England and France were perceptive enough to recognize that they could not hope, ultimately, to survive an Arab-Communist alliance in the Middle East that would, in due course, suffocate them economically, and outflank them strategically. And these particular leaders were courageous enough to act on that knowledge.

And so they moved.

Three months ago, when Nasser seized the Suez Canal, we wrote that the situation called for a historic change in direction. Specifically, we recommended reoccupation of the Zone by the British, pending a settlement. Any historic change in direction, we wrote further, must by its nature appear faltering

and clumsy. And in the ensuing weeks, as the West temporized, we wrote that such action would appear clumsier, and more inappropriate, the more time was allowed to go by before effecting it. What England and France have now done they should have done weeks since; but it is good that, finally, they have shown resolution.

American resentment is in part due to the failure of the British and French to let us in on their deliberations. Our pride was terribly wounded. But the British and French put a lower value on our pride than on their survival. This is understandable. The State Department had proved incapable of understanding, vicariously, the immediate dependence, economically, politically and psychologically, of the British and French on the Middle East; and our soggy indecisiveness, which our allies endured week after tedious week, as the situation worsened, had the objective effect of seriously hindering the British and French, and encouraging Nasser. So they proceeded without us. We should, as we cool off, find that understandable.

What, then, should American policy at this moment be? We did not interfere, physically, in the military operations, did not need to, were not asked to, and, properly, did not volunteer to. There is no need for American military involvement in the Middle East. Such a need would occur only if the Soviet Union chose to make it a parade ground for the display of her strength. It is highly unlikely that she will.

But we should explicitly acknowledge the fact that we have enduring interests in the Middle East. Accordingly, we should publicly sympathize with the carefully limited objectives of the English and French. We should stress that our quarrel is with Nasser and his Communist friends, not with the people of the Middle East. We should make it immediately clear that we are not in league with Israeli imperialists, and would not consent to Israel's exploitation of the Suez crisis for national aggrandizement. To that end, we should urge the governments of Great Britain and France to stand by the declaration that they will not consider the Suez question settled until the Israelis return to the boundaries from which they broke loose last week, and to insist that the UN accept this commitment as a condition of turning the Suez over to it. Great Britain and France should, moreover, continue to emphasize that it is their intention to remove the Suez Canal from within reach of Nasser's caprice, and nothing more—that beyond that (which would serve to frustrate the Egypto-Russian alliance, and delimit Nasser's powers), they claim no further voice in the internal affairs of Egypt, and will not interfere with the retention of Nasser as president, if that is what the Egyptians want.

We pray that the British and French will not be persuaded to cede the psychological advantages they have gained by allowing the United Nations to suffuse the issue with a welter of debate and veto and doubletalk and excruciating tenderness toward everybody that would serve to becloud what must not be allowed to be forgotten: that Nasser's arrogant and exorbitant demands upon the West were, finally, met with a thundering No, backed up by an exposed sabre.

2. *The Ideas of Eisenhower*

In his handling of the Middle East crisis, the President has applied certain ideas that are part of what has become an Eisenhower theory—or perhaps more accurately an Eisenhower rhetoric—of international relations. An action can be wrong only once; but there is no limit to the number of times that damage can result from a false idea persistently held. And the ideas here in question, by which our Middle Eastern policy has currently been guided, are false.

The President condemned Israel, Britain and France as “the aggressors.” By the term “aggressor” Mr. Eisenhower means . . . but just exactly what *does* he mean? He *thinks* he means the nation that first sends a hostile army across the border of another nation. But how big an army? Three men? Thirty? Three hundred? Or whole divisions? Actually, Israel and Egypt—like many nations between which tensions exist—have both been sending hostile units of armed men across each other's borders for years.

And what sort of army defines aggression? Does it have to be regular armies in regular uniform? It is not aggression, then, when Nasser sends agents and arms and money and virulent propaganda into French North Africa and France itself, or into the British oil installations of Iran and Bahrein? What about Communists who, under Soviet directive, kill, sabotage and lead revolutions in so many countries? Because they are not called “soldiers” and wear no Red Army uniforms, is the Soviet Union then wholly excused from aggression? Was there no Soviet aggression in China?

Is the timing all-important? Is Nation X invariably the aggressor if it moves two seconds before Nation Y? In order to retain its moral purity, does Nation X have invariably to wait until it suffers Nation Y's blow, even if there is no further doubt that the blow is coming, that it may be decisive, and that it could be blunted?

Is it also irrelevant what interests and values may be at stake? If India saw Red China on the verge of invasion, would India be the aggressor if her leaders determined that the invasion could be successfully blocked only in China, before it got rolling? Would it

indeed—as the President implied a few years back—be “aggression” if the Free Chinese on Formosa felt it possible to take the initiative in a campaign to liberate their homeland? Were the Minute Men aggressors?

The simplistic notion—first popularized by Maxim Litvinov in the League of Nations—that “aggression” may be significantly defined in terms of the timing of border crossings is not adequate to cover the infinitely complex network of relations between modern nations, or the subtle and indirect structure of modern strategy. The attempt to use this definition as a talisman for international policy decision is the lazy mind's substitute for serious analysis. It can, and on occasion must, lead to dangerous, often absurd conclusions, counter to the national interest and security and, for that matter, to basic considerations of international well-being and morality.

A comparable analysis may be made of the Eisenhower idea, also applied to this Middle East crisis, that a “resort to force” is always and necessarily wrong. In fact, so superficial is this commonplace of pacifist rhetoric that it constantly refutes itself. In the President's own address of October 31, where he unconditionally rejected the resort to force in one paragraph, he went on to “rejoice” in the “dramatic events in Hungary, where this brave people, as so often in the past, have offered their very lives for independence”—i.e., he rejoiced in their resort to force.

Mossadegh Disproved?

Across the arid land of Lebanon lie two pipelines, which normally—assuming anything ever is normal in the Middle East—carry 22 million tons of Europe-destined oil a year. And Iraq Petroleum and Trans-Arabian Pipeline have normally paid Lebanon handsome royalties, under a royalty-instead-of-taxes agreement negotiated several years ago.

But Lebanon, a while ago, became greedy. Why not, its ministers reasoned, impose *taxes* as well as royalties on the companies *and*—in the Middle East one brilliant idea of this kind swiftly follows another—make the taxes retroactive to 1951? The pipeline companies, of course, would kick up a fuss. But everybody knows that the West always gives in where money is concerned. Mossadegh proved that.

But Lebanon was due a surprise: both companies flatly refused to pay up. When, moreover, the Lebanese Government tried them off against one another, they still refused—refused even, if you please, to *discuss* tax rates, on the grounds that taxes would violate the contracts under which they had operated, and invested, in Lebanon.

Nor is that all: Iraq Petroleum now announces that it is building a new and larger pipeline, bypassing Lebanon in favor of Syria, and that "reluctantly" it is dismissing 120 "surplus" Lebanese workers who have become redundant because of the new arrangements.

The result? A cabinet crisis that may unseat the present Government. And frantic efforts on Lebanon's part to persuade Syria to refuse Iraq Petroleum transit privileges to which Syria, dazzled by prospects of even higher oil royalties, is turning a deaf ear.

All this may, conceivably, teach the itchy-fingered governments in the Middle East and elsewhere a lesson. But that is to assume—unwarrantedly—that they are capable of learning.

Sun-Struck?

It is ironic that the six most conservative states in the Union are the only ones that voted for Adlai Stevenson for President! If any of the people down there in the Deep South who pushed the Stevenson button were told that in doing so they were in effect inviting Walter Reuther to organize their lives for them, they would faint. They were voting, primarily, in conformity with tradition. There was no pressing reason to desert tradition that they could see, for the Republicans of the Supreme Court decision are not their friends; so they just coasted along, and gave Stevenson the only states he got.

But what of the rest of the nation? What are we to conclude from the solidarity behind General Eisenhower? Certainly it is a mark of confidence in him. Is it not also an emphatic rejection of Adlai Stevenson? And if so, why? It is true that he lapsed into the worst kind of demagoguery in the last month of

the campaign; but he never matched the vulgarity of Harry Truman, whom the people once endorsed. What is it about Stevenson? Or is it the pull of Eisenhower, and nothing but that, that brought him to the rocks?

It remains to be said that the election was not fought over issues, which is why such an anomaly as the constancy of the South to the Democratic ticket is understandable. The people have been basking under Eisenhower's smile, liking it in a lazy sort of way, and so, half way through, they turned around, to expose the other side to the sun for another four years; is that not all there is to it?

It may be, on the other hand, that the Eisenhower victory has broken the back of the hard conservative resistance in American politics. The narrow escapes of conservatives who were re-elected, the scattered defeats of conservatives who didn't quite make it, the enormous strength of Eisenhower, may bring about a collapse of organized, or even informal political resistance to the ways of progressive moderation.

Well, so much more for people like us to do.

And Be Done With It

All kinds of people are, these days, urging that we "re-examine" religion. ("Re-examine," as used by the social scientists, is the polite and fastidiously open-minded euphemism for "junk.") It is not merely the Communists who join Marx in dismissing religion as the opium of the people, or the doddering, reactionary naturalists and humanists; Christianity is under fire on a number of diverse, up-to-date fronts. Arnold Toynbee, for example, goes busily about from sect to sect, bent on synthesizing a religious Esperanto satisfactory to all, offensive to none. Colin Wilson wants a New religion (Voltaire knew how to accomplish *that*. Asked how by a young disciple, he instructed him: "First you go and get crucified; then you rise again from the dead.") Dr. Lawrence Kubie of Yale, forecasting an end to human mortality, can't see where there will be room left for the "remote hereafter" of orthodox religions. Aldous Huxley informed us the other day that religion must be "re-examined" in the light of the discovery of drugs that can "alter human behavior."

Why not take a vote on religion in the United Nations, and be done with this talk, talk, talk?



Leonard Hall

Jacobi

NATIONAL REVIEW is interested in assembling data on the response by the clergy to the uprising in the satellite nations. We would be grateful to our readers for information on the position taken on those uprisings in their home towns and churches.

NATIONAL TRENDS

L. BRENT BOZELL

Post Mortem

The people are jumping at the tanks, throwing in hand grenades and closing the drivers' windows. . . . They just brought us a rumor that American troops will be here within one or two hours. . . . We are well and fighting at 9:20 a. m.—RADIO BUDAPEST November 4, 1956.

"They brought that in to me, Foster, the day the Russians moved back in. I didn't think much about it at the time, and then you were sick for a while; but—well, I think this: that it was a tragedy. But surely we didn't lead them on in any way, did we?"

"Look, Mr. President, I know exactly how you feel. But we will always have people who indulge in wishful thinking. We cannot prevent that. We certainly did everything humanly possible, politically possible, to let them know we could not go along with a complete revolution."

"You mean the speech—the one we put on the Voice when Nagy was trying to get things in order over there?"

"The speech, yes—that was part of it. You used practically the same words I had used a few days before: 'We have publicly declared we do not demand of these governments their adoption of any particular form of society as a condition upon our economic assistance . . . We have also—with respect to the Soviet Union—sought clearly to remove any false fears that we would look upon new governments in these Eastern European countries as potential military allies. We have no such ulterior purpose.' That last part, especially, was designed, in part anyway, to warn the Hungarians that we could not encourage any anti-Communism."

"Certainly. But that's where I wonder if we shouldn't—couldn't—have been more clear about your intentions. Apparently they didn't catch on."

"Let's face it, Mr. President. Had you been more definite about proposing anti-Communist revolutions in Europe at this time, you might well

be packing for Gettysburg today. And anyway, we just must not feel that we are responsible for the bloodletting. The Hungarians, once they got going, were bound to go in fighting irrespective of what they believed we wanted them to do."

"I suppose."

"Besides, in our actions, we did absolutely nothing to encourage the rebels. Our people over there could have helped them set up an anti-Communist government, which we could have immediately recognized. We could have dropped weapons or run an airlift from Germany. All of these things could have been arranged at the ostensible invitation of the rebels if we wanted to keep anti-Communism alive. The fact that we did nothing ought to have been a pretty good indication of how we wanted to see things develop. It's a shame the rebels didn't understand, so as to avoid all the bloodletting."

"Foster, I think this: that perhaps you—we—should begin to inform the public, candidly, that is, about our thinking on Eastern Europe. It is the right thinking, after all, and I think we can now bring along public thinking with us, on our principles."

"Yes, sir. I agree. Especially since the Soviet Union has so vividly demonstrated that anti-Communism in Eastern Europe is unrealistic at this time. But I must say, in self-defense, that I have not been entirely negligent in this regard. I think we have paved the way—within the limits of prudence, of course—for public understanding of this problem. For Scotty [James Reston of the *New York Times*] made it clear directly following the first Hungarian uprising in October that we were disturbed by the turn of events, that we feared that the Hungarians, unlike the Poles, were going to lose everything by trying to get everything at once. Then, on November 1, Earl Voss let nearly the whole works out of the bag on the front page of the *Washington Star*.

The Department naturally did not confirm the Voss story, but it did not deny it either. And everyone knows the *Star* is a responsible paper."

"I saw Scotty's piece, of course; but I must have missed the *Star*."

"I have it right here, Mr. President: 'The U.S. and the Soviet Union,' Voss wrote, 'have been in secret contact through Yugoslav mediators in search of a mutually suitable formula for lessening Moscow's grip on Eastern Europe without turning the satellites over to anti-Soviet domination. Shortly before the Polish and Hungarian uprisings burst upon the world Secretary of State Dulles sent a special message to the Kremlin through the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Koca Popovic, who slipped in and out of Washington virtually unnoticed. Mr. Dulles urged the Kremlin to move fast to satisfy the mounting demands for autonomy in the Eastern European states with moderate concessions before indignation mounted so high that nationalist forces would get completely out of hand. The United States does not want, and assumes the Soviet Union does not want, the frontiers of anti-Soviet Europe pushed to the USSR's own borders . . . American policy makers realize, Mr. Popovic was told in Washington, that Moscow could not accept hostile neighbors, and likely would be provoked to war if the tide were allowed to turn against it in Eastern Europe. . . . Dangers that a war in East Europe 'would develop into the dreaded nuclear holocaust are rated too strong by both sides to risk even a small war . . . America's main concern, it now appears, is that the satellite unrest will get so far out of hand that the Soviet Union will not be able to live with the new neighbors' leaders . . . That's the gist of it.'"

"It seems to cover the idea pretty well . . . And he's completely right: Modern war is unthinkable. In fact, Foster, it's preposterous . . . It's just that I wish those people hadn't counted on us. Even though you're right, it kind of haunts you—you know."

"I know, Mr. President. I admit it haunts me, too—even though I know you're right. There is one consolation: certainly no one will ever misunderstand us in the future."

"That is certainly true."

The Election

SAM M. JONES

As Predicted—Only More So

Washington, November 7: Two weeks ago this correspondent predicted the election of General Eisenhower with a minimum of 311 electoral votes; a Senate composed of 50 Democrats and 46 Republicans, and a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives. On November 1, my forecast—revised in view of the international conflicts and domestic apprehension—included 61 additional electoral votes, or a total of 372, and no change in the outlook for a Democratic Congress.

It is now certain that the President's electoral score will exceed 450. The depth and scope of this vote of confidence is perhaps all the more spectacular because the landslide carried only the White House. The Democrats have retained control of both House and Senate, despite the election of a Republican President. This situation has not occurred in more than a hundred years; not since 1848 when General Zachary Taylor, the Whig candidate, was elected Chief Executive with a Democratic Congress.

Behind the Landslide

The Eisenhower landslide has exceeded the expectations of nearly all observers and the hopes of the President's most optimistic admirers; it did not, however, refute the pre-election outlook. Eisenhower could not extend this personal popularity to the benefit of his party. Franklin D. Roosevelt, on the other hand, the only President to pile up a larger electoral vote (in 1936), had a far greater persuasiveness. He unfailingly induced the country to give him congressional majorities along with his own victories.

Quite possibly the reverse side of Eisenhower's popularity is underestimated; Stevenson's lack of mass appeal was almost painfully evident throughout the campaign. The element of confidence may have been equally influential. Eisenhower, the acclaimed

military genius, who had ended the Korean war and had kept America free from further conflict, towered in the public mind like a Gibraltar of security over his untried civilian opponent.

Highlights

With less than a day's perspective on a momentous election, here are what seem to be its highlights, upsets and implications:

1. Eisenhower's overwhelming mandate assures him of a comparatively long honeymoon period, even with an opposition Congress.

2. Despite the fact that the President smashed the South for a second time and captured such hitherto unvarying Democratic strongholds as Jersey City, the intrinsic Democratic strength is far greater than the Republican, as demonstrated in the congressional, gubernatorial and local elections.

3. The highly publicized, abundantly financed AFL-CIO political adjunct to the Democratic Party failed miserably to sell union members on its doctrine of class war.

4. The Negro vote manifested itself in two spheres, and in both it helped Eisenhower. It was of immense



Lausche


advantage in big cities, and it cut into the Democratic vote in many Southern states, especially Louisiana, where it was believed to be decisive.

5. The storm clouds in the farm belt rained trouble on many GOP congressional candidates, but on Eisenhower they rained roses.

6. The defeat of Senator Duff had been a long-time probability because of the GOP feud in Pennsylvania at the state level, and Duff's failure to do much for himself in the capital or the state. Lausche's enormous bipartisan strength in Ohio made him the obvious favorite over Bender. Welker's popularity in Idaho, despite his conservative voting record, was at the nadir even among Taft Republicans. Former Republican Senator Revercomb's victory in West Virginia was aided to a degree by Eisenhower's sweep of the state, but perhaps more substantially by the noxious reputation of his opponent's regime as governor. The defeat of McKay in Oregon by the political chameleon Senator Morse was anticipated and is explicable on the grounds that Morse, like Lausche in Ohio, seems to have a bipartisan following regardless of his party affiliation. Eisenhower's coat-tails proved to be long enough to serve as lifelines for Dirksen in Illinois and Bush in Connecticut. They also apparently helped Javits in New York when his anticipated election was threatened with a large-scale desertion of Jewish voters. The lassitude of Mayor Wagner's campaign, however, may also have had something to do with it. The President's influence proved insufficient to win retiring Senator Millikin's seat for his good friend Dan Thornton in Colorado, or to unseat Democratic Senator Bible in Nevada.

7. The failure of the T. Coleman Andrews ticket to run up an imposing vote in Virginia was a surprise to this correspondent and to many of that state's foremost editorial observers. There is not enough information as yet available to analyze the part played by third-party voters throughout the states, but it is believed to have been considerable, especially in the South.

8. Walter Reuther's vision of himself as the Man on Horseback in a Democratic saddle has been rudely shattered.



The THIRD WORLD WAR

JAMES BURNHAM

Adenauer's Move

The past month's events in Eastern Europe are the initial phase in a major historical process. This process, if it continues to develop in the direction set by its initial phase, will cause the breakup of "the Yalta pattern" according to which Eastern Europe has been organized as a satellite area of the Moscow-dictated Soviet Empire. That is the negative side. What, positively, would replace the Yalta pattern is not yet clear: an East European Federation balanced between Western Europe and Eurasian Russia? A collapse of the orthodox Soviet system, with a series of wars of succession? General world war?

The Yalta pattern has been violated, and a new process started—but started only. The entire process is (or would be) a long and uneven transition. Inevitably there would be turns, halts and twists. Moreover there is no certainty that it will in fact carry much beyond this beginning.

Moscow is trying to master it by direct brutality. But the Kremlin is unsure whether to try to reimpose the Yalta pattern, or to ride along with these early phases in the hope of molding the new process to a Titoist pattern that might be even more useful to the World Revolution.

Our press suggests that all Eastern Europe is by nature rabidly anti-Russian, and that the captive nations, once freed from external political control, would automatically line up against Moscow "on our side." This view is too simple. It overlooks enduring geopolitical realities that must be weighed along with less stable moral and psychological elements.

There are factors other than force and terror which incline Eastern Europe to Moscow, or at least squeeze counter to a final split. One such factor has been made significant during the Yalta period. It is the economic network through which the captive nations have been closely linked to the Soviet Union. Their economies

have been made dependent upon mutually related markets, raw material supplies, transport, parts of assembly and repair, fuel, etc. A drastic break with Moscow means an economic disruption that could be healed only with intelligent Western cooperation.

A second such factor is Germany. Eastern Europe fears Germany, and with much historical reason. For centuries national freedom in East Europe has been under periodic attack from Germany as well as from Russia. Still fresh in the minds of the living generation is the most ferocious of all the German onslaughts.

There is a new item in "the German problem," of a kind that has always been provocative: the "irredentist" issue created by the cession of previously German areas to Lithuania, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The threat of a rearmed and reunified Germany is never far from the consciousness of serious East Europeans, even if their immediate target is Moscow. It is geopolitical fact as well as Soviet tanks and the machinations of "national Communists" that leads the East European nations to draw back from a total break with the Kremlin. They are not altogether displeased that Red Army divisions occupy East Germany.

At the same time East Europe has an unavoidable need for Germany if it is to gain either economic or political independence from Russia.

The Adenauer Policies

The withdrawal of Soviet troops is the primary condition of the next stage in the process of destroying the Yalta pattern. The second is the action of West Germany, of Konrad Adenauer.

Up to now, Dr. Adenauer, in concert with Washington, has: a) refused to deal with the East German authorities, on the ground that they were

mere puppets of Moscow and not a true government; b) insisted that reunification could come not by any preliminary combining of the two regimes, but only by direct all-German elections; c) supported NATO, and German rearmament as part of the NATO plan; d) avoided close relations with the East European regimes or peoples.

With the fluidity which the sudden crises have introduced into Eastern Europe, Germany is in a position to take the initiative in pushing the new process forward. The problem is to convince the East Europeans that in their autonomous development, both political and economic, Germany can be a partner rather than a threat.

This requires a demonstrated willingness to break with the four-fold policy outlined above. Ignoring Moscow and the political forms of the moment, Germany could, for example, push a resumption of the large-scale economic, cultural and personal contacts with Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Balts, etc. that existed in the past but have been cut off during the Yalta period.

May it not be time for Dr. Adenauer to drop his previous conditions in order to make new overtures to East Germany? Actually, West Germany is now in a position to handle the demoralized East German Communists even if their terms of negotiation were accepted. In a reunified Germany, no matter how achieved, the weight should easily fall to the non-Communists and the West. Therefore Bonn cannot lose by taking this political initiative, even if nothing concrete can come of it for the time being.

Moves toward German reunification might increase the fears rather than the hopes of the East European nations. Should they not be coupled, therefore, with an expressed willingness on Bonn's part to negotiate the question of mutual disarmament, even a kind of neutralization, in Central and Eastern Europe—an extension of the Austrian solution?

The most dramatic and convincing German move would be, of course, a conciliatory proposal on the Oder-Neisse boundary and "the lost territories." No act could do more to erase the stain of Nazism, and few acts could better serve Germany's long-term interests.

Suez—Action Short of Nuclear War

National Review's London correspondent sees in the Suez action the only hope of protecting the Free World's Mediterranean position without general war

F. A. VOIGT

Whether they judge the action taken by France and Great Britain to have been right or wrong originally, all who wish the Free World to survive must wish it success. To say "must" in this manner may seem excessively categorical and presumptuous, but we have only to consider the alternatives to see that success offers the Atlantic Powers as a whole at least a prospect, in fact the only prospect, of arresting the disintegration of the Middle East and of preventing that region from falling under Russian domination. And it is perfectly clear to every rational observer that the defeat of France and Great Britain would be a major victory, first, for the revolutionary movement that extends from furthest Indonesia to the Atlantic shores of Morocco, and, secondly—and finally—for Russia. Only a major war—in fact, a nuclear war—could restore, if at all, the position the Atlantic powers as a whole would have lost if the present action of France and Great Britain were to end in failure.

This consideration alone makes it necessary that the other Atlantic powers, America above all, at least refrain from weakening or obstructing the action, or from diverting it from its true purpose and substituting misguided or ineffective action, or inaction, by the United Nations. The two European powers are well able to finish what they have begun without the help of others. They have not asked for American help and they do not need it. What they do need, and what the whole of the Free World needs, is that America should wish them success and should leave no doubt in their minds, and in the minds of all nations, that if Russia intervenes, it shall be "hands off."

At the same time it is pertinent to consider—without prejudice to any judgment on the action now that it is irrevocable—whether, originally, it

was right in conception, honorable, reasonable, and in the best interests of the two powers themselves and of their Allies, especially of the United States.

In any case, no one has suggested any alternative. The attitude of the entire Opposition in Great Britain—that is to say of all Socialists and all Liberals (an attitude shared more or less covertly by not a few Conservatives)—has been, and remains, completely negative. The same is true, as far as we can judge by quotations in the British press, of American critics—they too, as far as we can gather, have no valid answer to the question "What ought to have been done?" For the answers "Let the United Nations decide!" or "Negotiation, not Force!" are transparent evasions and not serious answers.

Zone More Vital than Canal

The Canal and the Canal Zone are together vital to the security of the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean. And the Zone is more important than the Canal. The Canal is a highway connecting two oceans, a lifeline, as it were, especially for Britain, but if it were to be silted up and rendered useless, the consequences would be a considerable financial loss and not much more. But the Zone, traversed by the Canal, connects Asia and Africa. If undefended, it enables the Middle Eastern and North African (especially the Egyptian) revolutions to join forces, to annihilate Israel, and to prepare the way for the Russian invasion. Russia, established in that Zone (whether overtly or covertly), will be the master of the Middle East and of North Africa and will, in alliance with Yugoslavia (as long as Yugoslavia remains under Communist domination) be able to challenge the Anglo-American command of the

eastern Mediterranean, and threaten the security of the Straits and the independence of Greece.

These dangers have long been clearly discernible on the horizon, but the Atlantic powers did nothing to prepare against them except to talk interminably. Thanks to France and Great Britain, something has been done, something other than talk: swift, bold action, severely limited to its essential purpose—amid the indignation and execration of the greater part of articulate mankind, as though to act were in itself immoral, and only talk were moral.

The British Government has not been moved by any sympathy for Israel. Indeed, anti-Zionism is strongly entrenched in the Conservative Party. Many members who, today, entirely support the Government, hold that it was a mistake, and far more than a mistake, that it was neither honorable nor politic, to promote the establishment of the Zionist state, which could never have come into existence without the help of Great Britain. On the other hand, Israel is the darling of the Left. When it seemed that Israel would be in great danger because Egypt was being armed by Russia, the cry went forth from the ranks of the Left (from Mr. Crossman, for example, in the *Daily Mirror*): "Arm Israel!" But, of course, Israel was not to use her arms—not even Israel may "resort to force."

It is necessity that has made France and Great Britain the associates of Israel in the present enterprise—and yet not wholly the associates, for by interposing their forces between those of Israel and Egypt they will probably have preserved the Canal Zone, and Egypt herself, from invasion by Israel.

Had the war between Israel and Egypt been allowed to go on, it would,

(Continued on p. 22)

The PRINTED Word

Just Between Us World-Citizens

The Liberal propaganda machine's soft-spoken and decorous *Christian Science Monitor*, looking out over the world from its point of vantage in cultivated Boston, on two typical days did the following:

—refused to “prophecy,” but called the shots pretty well in a speculative editorial on how the Suez crisis would affect the election; noted, without being any more specific, that there are “some voters who have a strong attachment to Israel” and have taken the President’s position “amiss”; admired the President for ignoring such considerations in favor of “saving peace by peaceful means”; politely pointed out that Mr. Stevenson was finding “some difficulty in saying just what he would do differently”; figured that “being in power at such a moment” gives the President an advantage, since it “tends to push his name into the headlines as representing the whole Nation”; almost but not quite said what this columnist has been thinking, namely: that the worse the mess Mr. Eisenhower’s policies get us into the more convinced people seem to be that only he—and those policies—can extricate us, so that for him nothing succeeds like failure.

—gave the lie to the USSR on its statement that there were no Soviet military units in the peoples’ democracies other than Hungary, Poland and Rumania (“This seems to ignore East Germany, . . . in which are reportedly more Soviet divisions than in all the other satellites combined”); shrewdly questioned the USSR’s good faith about that “great commonwealth of socialist nations”; opined that after thinking it over a little Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, all “ancient victims of German might,” may prefer to have some Red Army legions along the Elbe; ventured the guess that the economic bonds the USSR has forged on its Warsaw associates “will not be easy to break”; ended on a note of skepticism: “But most significant of all, Moscow is turning on the ingratiating charm at the moment French and British guns

are spitting over Suez”; conveyed the impression that it, at least, is not going to be taken in by that charm.

—liked the 1957 model automobiles: speed is “built into the very look of the new dreamboats”; noted that styles in transportation are changing in the Far East as well, where the “hand-pulled ‘rickshaw’ . . . has given way to the pedicab, a kind of half-bicycle, half-phaeton”; decided that “lest we forget!—this, too, is progress.”

—put in a good word for the “little things” in life; conceded that they can be a nuisance at times, but urged its readers to take the larger and longer view: “the little crises help us to endure through the big ones, reminding us of the continuity of human needs, of human hopes, of human achievements despite the assaults of ‘historic events’ upon them”; cited as an example of a little thing the sparrow that “lands on the window sill and asks if you have forgotten to put out his crumbs again”; left even this hardened reader with a somewhat gladdened heart.

—tried ever so hard to see a “change for the better in the whole Middle East crisis” as a result of the UN’s cease-fire resolution, found it finally in Mr. Dulles’ notion of “dealing” with the Middle East situation “as a whole”; had it a little of both ways about the British-French claim that they are engaged in a “police action that can serve UN needs,” by arguing a) that the claim will not hold water, and b) that the Anglo-French action can best be understood by analogy with a strike in a labor dispute (they “struck against conditions the urgency of which neither the world organization nor Allied diplomacy had fully recognized”); proclaimed the rousing slogan “Let the UN Take Over” (it can “establish commissions to supervise a cease-fire and to work out a basis for settling the issues which have led to the crisis”); in passing, rubbed its hands over the fact that the British Government is under heavy fire at home (it

“can well use any bridges the UN may build back toward . . . support for the Western alliance and UN principles”).

—delivered itself of some appropriate sentiments about non-voting (we can “hardly be content” with the fact that in other democracies three-fourths of the qualified voters vote, while here, at best, only three-fifths vote); got through the whole editorial, however, without using the word “shame,” and accentuated the positive by suggesting that the “helpful zeal devoted to get-out-the-vote drives” be applied to some of the “antiquated or faulty laws” that often keep people who wish to vote from doing so: state residence requirements should be reduced, since national elections call for no knowledge of local conditions; annual registration is an “unnecessary obstacle”; state poll taxes and literacy tests should be reconsidered (they are probably unconstitutional anyway); something must be done about the one-party system where it still flourishes (it fosters, in many people, the view that voting is not worth the trouble); and too many citizens still accept the “cynical view that there is no real difference between the parties”; did not explain what shape the new anti-cynicism law might take.

—called the French Government on the carpet about the “deplorable ruse” by which it captured those five Algerian rebels, and about the “tawdry legal trick” involved in charging them with treason just because “they are technically French citizens under French law”; here is a “highly dramatic and inflammatory situation calling for truly imaginative Western statesmanship,” and the French go and let themselves be carried away by “mere legal logic,” thereby insulting the “newly independent governments in North Africa”; summoned the French to recognize that in this background of “twisted judgment” current French promises (security of property and person for all Algerians who “respond to peace appeals”) are useless.

—unintentionally answered, to this columnist’s satisfaction, a question he wrestles with every day, namely: Could anything be duller than the editorials in the *Times*? The answer: Yes, those in the *Monitor*. W. K.

Retire—On What?

The life insurance industry is groping for a solution to this problem: how to meet retirement needs with a constantly shrinking dollar. Meanwhile the Welfare State progressively devours our life savings

KARL E. ETTINGER

The introduction of variable annuities, based on the changing values of investments in stocks rather than on the relatively fixed values of bonds and mortgages, has split the life insurance industry into two camps.

One faction, under the leadership of the giant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and its president, Frederic W. Ecker, contends that variable policy promises, based on equity investment, are most undesirable. Others, led by the president of The Prudential Insurance Company of America, emphatically advocate the adoption of such new insurance practices as supplements to current policies written in fixed dollar amounts.

Behind this controversy is the growing awareness of the public that life insurance policies depreciate in an inflation. Conventional policies are promissory documents based on a fixed number of dollars payable in the future, irrespective of what the purchasing power of the dollar will be when payment is due. Insurance salesmen are instructed by their teachers and by the insurance companies to sell concrete risk coverage—the satisfaction of a future family need rather than the promise of an abstract amount of dollars.

Every reader of mass magazines will remember the glowing promises made by insurance companies in advertisements practically unchanged over the years, except for the gradual increase in the monthly income promised for worry-free retirement to Florida. These advertisements have certainly produced substantial annuity sales. They have also caused substantial doubts of the economic wisdom of those who make such promises.

For instance, the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U.S. in No-

vember 1932 promised its policyholders' widows an "adequate insurance protection" by presenting the example of ten homes of deceased clients. "The running expenses of these ten homes are cared for by Equitable monthly checks . . . families maintain their accustomed standards of living . . . double protection provides also retirement income for your own future days of leisure." In September of the same year, Phoenix Mutual offered the answer to the question "How you can retire on an income of \$250 a month for life." The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company promised "a simple guaranteed arrangement—adjusted to meet expenses of professional, business or vocational training. Give your boy a chance!"

Shrinking Annuities

Up to a short time ago, the life insurance industry staked its future entirely on the assumption that the fluctuations in the buying power of the dollar were either temporary or negligible. But policyholders, relying for coverage of their needs on the promises given them years ago, need no economic theory to understand the difference between expectation and performance in dollars and cents.

For many years after the departure from the gold standard, the insurance industry operated in the mistaken conviction that times of shrinking purchasing power might be followed by opposite trends. Insurance companies felt that appeals to political reason might re-establish a sound dollar. The Institute of Life Insurance, and many insurance companies individually, conducted extensive "anti-inflation campaigns" through their advertising agencies. But this, as everybody knows, produced no results. Inflation had reached the

point of no return. More and more buyers adjusted their policies to a probably continued shrinkage in buying power.

As a consequence, there developed a marked trend away from endowment policies (insurance with a function of savings) toward purchase of term insurance (policies with a pure life-risk coverage). Mutual funds and investment houses that sell equity in the form of corporate stock, home purchase on installment, and installment buying in general, have for many families replaced insurance as a means of saving. These types of investment contain no risk coverage and, therefore, have no insurance function. But the public has turned to them because, in postwar years, the value of these investments has often increased at least as much as the cost of living.

In 1955, the Prudential Insurance Company of America sold only 533 individual annuities, and more than three times that number went off the books. Prudential, with 46 million policies and certificates in force, may not have tried to push the sale of these policies too hard. But the overall figures listed by the *Life Insurance Fact Book*, 1956, demonstrate a general trend away from dollar annuities. Between 1940 and 1955, the number of straight life insurance policies grew from 39 million to 80 million—or more than 100 per cent. In the same period the number of individual annuity policies in force increased from 940,000 to 1,252,000—or only about 35 per cent.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes a cost-of-living index based on the average of 1947-1949. (By giving these years the value 100, the Bureau creates an optical illusion that disguises the true condition of our dollar.) Their Consumer Price Index

gave for the first half of 1955 an average of 114.3. It is based on observations in 34 cities, but it ignores the great regional differences and changing patterns of consumption.

Were we to base our cost of living on the dollar of 1913 (the last real peacetime dollar), we would arrive at an index of about 272 for 1955. That means that insurance purchased to supply the equivalent in consumer satisfaction of 1,000 dollars of 1913, today would have to pay 2,720 dollars. Though in the period from 1913 to 1955 there were occasional declines in the cost of living (1917, 1921-22, 1928-1934, 1939) the long-range trend was unequivocally a shrinkage in the purchasing power of the dollar. The paramount fact is that the dollar in 1955 bought less than half what it bought in 1932. And in 1956 it lost another 3 per cent in value.

Nearly Every Family Involved

By the end of 1955, the Life Insurance Institute estimated on the basis of probability sampling methods that there were about 103 million people protected by policies of commercial insurance companies. Of these, about 24 million were covered by group insurance. The total amounted to \$400 billion, including group coverage that in 1955 for the first time reached the figure of \$100 billion. There are more than 1,000 life insurance companies in business. Employee welfare fund programs, not covered by these companies, cover more than 75 million persons and have accumulated pension reserves estimated at 20 to 25 billion dollars.

These figures indicate two outstanding facts: first, that practically every family in the United States has a stake in life insurance and in the defense of the dollar; second, that in spite of the downward spiral of shrinking purchasing power the public still turns to life insurance for protection.

That life insurance seems incapable of covering the risk of inflation in addition to the life risk, does not yet deter the insurance buyers. However, the obvious growth and income advantages for the past few years of investment-in-equity securities over dollar bonds have created a demand for new types of insurance that offer the life-risk coverage of traditional

(bond-and-loan-secured) policies and at the same time promise the larger yield (and appreciation proportional to the sinking buying power of the dollar) generally attributed to equity investment. The Mutual Funds have resorted to offering a "Put-Take Service" that will slowly liquidate an investor's mutual-fund holdings in equal monthly installments, comparable to annuity payments. But in the absence of the insurance factor, covering the risk that the investor may outlive the coverage of monthly payments by his funds, this device cannot replace the need for insurance annuities.

A Revolutionary Plan

Insurance is not a frozen business. More than 25 per cent of all policies in force today are of recently developed contract types, created to meet new needs resulting from social developments of the day. All these new types, however, remain within the framework of the insurance reserves primarily invested in interest-bearing dollar-securities and mortgages, with only small fractions of the total invested in stocks, real estate and similar ventures. Many of the rigid state laws under which the companies operate doubt the virtue of equity investment. New York State does not permit a company operating under its jurisdiction to hold more than 3 per cent of its funds in stocks. It was therefore a major revolution when, in 1952, the (non-profit) Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA), an organization serving more than 700 institutions of learning and research, provided through the College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) "a retirement income program that tends to keep in step with economic trends and living costs."

CREF created a new form of insurance—the variable annuity life insurance. Operating under a special law of New York State, it offered to the policyholders of TIAA, its companion organization, the opportunity to purchase up to 50 per cent of their annuity holdings in the form of a policy based on equity investment and offering variable payments, depending on the value of the stock reserves at the time of payments. Holders of such policies are therefore covered by the investment provisions of their

contract as if they had acquired holdings in mutual funds, and by the traditional insurance features for the risks of life expectancy. Whether or not this new contract will prove to be satisfactory over the long run, it must appeal to the academic clients of TIAA and CREF: more than 25,000 professors and researchers have availed themselves of it. In insurance, this development is as revolutionary as breaking through the sound barrier was in aviation.

Related to Cost of Living

The variable-annuity principle is based on the assumption that there is some relationship between the cost of living and the prices of equity securities. The proponents of insurance covered by stock are not naive enough to believe that cost-of-living trends and stock prices move always in a fixed relationship. But, over some years now, when consumer goods and services have gone up stock prices have followed in the average. There have been some instances contradicting this assumption of average behavior of prices. Also, the new policy offers accounting and actuarial problems, but its advocates point to the following figures:

If between 1940 and 1954 the return from an annual premium of \$1,000, for 20 years, covered a fixed annuity of \$2,510 in accord with living costs of \$2,510 in 1940, a variable annuity based on investment in stocks would have paid

	(Adjusted Cost of Living)	Variable Annuity
1940:	\$2,510	\$2,410
1941:	2,640	2,260
1942:	2,920	1,990
1943:	3,100	2,610
1944:	3,140	2,830
1945:	3,220	3,400
1946:	3,490	3,880
1947:	3,990	3,450
1948:	4,290	3,530
1949:	4,240	3,510
1950:	4,290	4,280
1951:	4,660	5,170
1952:	4,750	5,510
1953:	4,790	5,600
1954:	4,810	6,650

Note that in some of these years the variable annuity paid less than the fixed dollar annuity of \$2,510 and that in 1940-1944 the return of the variable annuity did not catch up

with the increased cost of living. Yet the excess of variable over fixed-annuity payments in the later years makes a powerful argument for those who will take the risk of changing stock prices and trends.

No wonder then that other insurance companies want to enter the "ultrasonic" field of variable-annuity insurance and feel entitled to the privileges CREF currently enjoys.

Two privately owned life insurance companies in Washington, D. C. have entered the field—and have found numerous obstacles in their way. With the exception of the District of Columbia and West Virginia, all state-controlled insurance authorities have refused them permission to conduct business. The Security Exchange Commission, not usually concerned with the state-controlled insurance business, has claimed federal rights of supervision and has asked a company in Washington, D.C., to comply with expensive reporting requirements and federal regulations. This demand (probably instigated by the mutual funds and by investment houses jealous of insurance competition) is based on the allegation that insurance companies selling policies with stock investments are indirectly selling stocks and, therefore, are subject to federal (SEC) regulation. But such submission has never been demanded before, though conventional investment in bonds can, with no less justification, be defined as an indirect sale of bonds; and sales of bonds are subject to SEC jurisdiction.

Pros and Cons

While states and federal agencies attempt to prevent the variable-annuity sales, the insurance industry is hotly discussing the pros and cons in public hearings before state insurance commissioners, in industry meetings and in print. A bill passed by the New York State Legislature, permitting the sale of variable annuities, was vetoed by Governor Dewey. The hearings in the New Jersey Assembly in May 1956 gave the large insurance companies and the investment industry an opportunity to state their case. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners has taken no action either approving or disapproving the sale of variable annuities by life insurance agencies, but it has recom-

mended special legislation to protect the public if any state permits such sales.

There are a great number of problems inherent in the nature and the risks of investment of insurance funds in stocks. One of them is particularly serious, for it involves the fate of all life insurance based on fixed dollar promises. And this problem cannot be answered by technical argument. It concerns the confidence of the millions of policyholders in their insurance—a confidence that is the basis of the whole concept of life insurance.

President Ecker, of the Metropolitan, puts it thus:

The proponents conclude that a variable annuity will serve annuitant better than a fixed dollar annuity in safeguarding the purchasing power of retirement income. This places an insurance company and its agents in a curious dilemma, for if it urges the purchase of a variable annuity as a hedge against inevitable future inflation, it thereby demonstrates that it no longer has faith in the value of its insurance product offering guaranteed dollars. If the insurance company has recognized inflation as inevitable, why should a policyholder buy more life insurance, or, indeed, retain what he has?

Insurance principles may not have changed, but the dollar has. And this is not simply a change in value, a purely quantitative alteration. Today, under the influence of collectivist theories, currency has become an instrument of economic manipulation.



Kreutner

"Smear Tactics!"

The economists who influence our government, determined as they are to create miracles of Full Employment, of elimination of cycles, of farm price support, and of easy money at all times, have built continued money depreciation into our economic system.

Illusions of Welfare

Expropriation of the owners of money and of documents that give claim to money is the invention on which the system of the modern welfare state rests. The idea of creating illusions of welfare by a built-in "mild inflation" is about as sound as a "reform" of the thermometer scale to create the illusion of warmth. But here it is, and the insurance executives who expect a reversal of this trend may underestimate its popularity. For the powerful pressure groups which advocate Big Government, escalator wage clauses, public spending, price supports, etc., are defending vested interests. So are those who profit from the apparent appreciation of tangible goods during a decline of money values. In the meantime, every day more than 1,000 Americans reach the age of 65, joining the army of 14,000,000 persons over that age. Their life expectancy and, therefore, their dependence on stable prices grows. Is all that one can promise them retirement into desperation?

The Republican Platform promises to "maintain the purchasing power of a sound dollar" but it also advocates Full Employment as a federal responsibility. The Democratic platform attacks the hard money policy of the Republican Administration and calls it the "time bomb of the Republican crusade against full prosperity." And the consumer price index went up another 2 per cent in the three months ending July 15, 1956.

Variable annuities and similar contract forms of insurance tend to offer some relief for those in search of more complete protection. But like ultrasonic flight they still need testing. Actuarial principles of probability will solve problems of life expectancy, but we do not know how they can predict the behavior of average equity investment. The insurance industry still faces its vital problem: Can it adjust its services to the changing nature of the dollar?

The Myth We Call "Abroad"

Talk about racial discrimination "hurting American prestige abroad," says the author, ignores the far greater discrimination in most foreign countries

GUY PONCE DE LEON

Perhaps the most frequent remark one hears in any discussion of racial discrimination or segregation in America is that it hurts the prestige of the United States abroad. Why, I should like to ask, abroad? That adverb "abroad" tends to single out the United States as the lone black sheep in a lily-white flock.

Actually the manifestations of racial discrimination are more acute and extreme almost everywhere in the world than they have been in the United States for nearly a hundred years. In Sierra Leone, British West Africa, for example, I have seen natives "disciplined" by being made to stand in the tropical sun for hours at a time, each with a heavy stone on his head. In the very center of Dakar, before the unconcerned eyes of French citizens sipping their *apéritifs* in sidewalk cafés, I have seen Negroes beaten within an inch of their lives by drunken French soldiers. Until very recently, and so far as I know even now, French Army camps in North Africa considered cots for native soldiers an "unnecessary luxury." There is no question of "separate but equal" facilities. Facilities are separate, all right, but no one has ever dreamed they should be equal.

Nor is racial discrimination a monopoly of the white race. As any expert in Eastern affairs knows, the first factor to consider in dealing with Asiatics is their utter contempt for and distrust of the white man. And anyone who has not seen a Mohammedan spit when an infidel walks by has not fathomed the depths of religious and racial discrimination. We seem to have forgotten what Japanese racial hatred did to the Far East only a little over a decade ago. Even the Jews, themselves the victims of the most notorious racial discrimination of modern times, did not hesitate to create the first racist state in modern history.

In the Western Hemisphere the picture south of the United States is only slightly less extreme. A Cuban Negro artist told me once: "In Cuba to be white is as good as having a profession." In Brazil, a country where 80 per cent of the population is discreetly classified as "non-white," the state department gives pigmentation tests to its employees before sending them to its embassies abroad. As recently as 1950 the American Embassy had several brushes with some of Rio's de luxe hotels because of reservations it had made for visiting American Negro artists and scientists. Elsewhere in Central and South America the Indians, who in some countries constitute almost the entire population, are to this day ruled by an all-powerful minority of whites or mestizos. In Lima the word *cholo*, a derogatory term for the native Indians equivalent to "nigger," is constantly used in summoning servants and waiters. In Haiti, an all-Negro republic, few but octoroons can expect to obtain a government position or achieve social standing.

In Black Africa itself slavery still flourishes whenever the authority of the white man is not present. Slave trading between the Sudan and Saudi Arabia has for years been a matter of grave concern to England and the United Nations. Not long ago the British succeeded in breaking up one of these slave rings and freeing the victims, whom they placed in a camp to await transportation back to their homes. At first the rescued men expressed delight at their newly acquired freedom. Within several days, however, they sent a delegate to the British officer in charge with a petition: now that they were free men again, all they needed to be perfectly happy was a few slaves of their own.

Wars on the racial level have become such a sorry routine as to make almost logical the answer of an ad-

venturer on his way to fight in the recent uprising in North Africa. "On which side are you going to fight?" he was asked.

"It makes no difference," he replied. "Either on the side of the Arabs because they are a majority and therefore oppressed, or on the side of the French because they are a minority and are persecuted."

Ideal vs. Reality

These few examples could be multiplied *ad infinitum*. I am discussing here the reality, not the moral problems it raises; prevailing standards, not ideal principles. To confuse the ideal with reality is the mistake that is being made by those in the United States who cry that the good name of this country is being jeopardized "abroad" because of racial discrimination. Their fear is based on an erroneous concept of "abroad." This error in turn leads them to indulge in a sort of wishful thinking that assumes we are now living in a society that exists nowhere on earth. Thus they are self-conditioned against recognizing a fact as indisputable as it may seem to them astonishing: the United States is *ahead* of the rest of the world in the quest for racial justice.

In a century that has produced mass enslavement on a scale hitherto unknown, America stands out as a pioneer among nations in its earnest effort to cope with one of the most complex problems of our age. If it is true that racial discrimination in America is of concern to the world, it is only because it is a major concern to Americans themselves. In the endeavor to find a humane and satisfactory solution blunders have inevitably been, and will be, made. But men of intelligence should not let their efforts be distorted by a wholly mythical conception of "abroad."

THE IVORY TOWER

WM. F. BUCKLEY, JR.

I am aware of having carped a bit in the previous dozen or so columns, and hence would like to take time off to pass out a few bouquets, for inspiring little thoughts, words, and deeds performed here and there, in recent days, by members of the academic community. May we proceed?

For Devotion to Truth

Awarded to Professor Bertrand Russell, whose most recent book, *Portraits From Memory*, was aptly introduced in the New York Times Sunday Book Review Section under the heading, "His Goddess Is Truth"—for his most recent offering on his Goddess' altar, his introduction to Corliss Lamont's book, *Freedom Is As Freedom Does*. Some prize-winning extracts:

Anybody [in America] who goes so far as to support equal rights for colored people, or to say a good word for UN, is liable to be visited by officers of the FBI and threatened, if not with prosecution, at least with blacklisting and consequently inability to earn a living. When a sufficient state of terror has been produced by these means, the victim is informed that there is a way out: If he will denounce a sufficient number of his friends as Communists, he may obtain absolution.

For Brilliant Observational Powers

Awarded to Professor Frederick Schuman of Williams, the experts' expert on the Soviet Union, for his penetrating remarks on changes in the Soviet Union, as reported by a student newspaper after Professor Schuman's return from Moscow:

Schuman considers a "genuine democratization of the party and the government" as the long-run hope and purpose of the present leaders in the Kremlin. [He looks forward to] . . . the abandonment of methods which have outlived their functions. The task of industrializing, urbanizing, and educating an illiterate peasant society has been accomplished by Stalin, "at frightful cost and by devices most hideous." Now that this major economic and social transfor-

mation is achieved, Stalin's ruthless methods have lost whatever economic justification they may have had and will be discarded . . . But . . . the thaw has come and the floodgates are half-open. The new Soviet polity, thanks to the transformation of Soviet society, is altogether likely to cherish civil rights, human dignity, and personal freedom beyond the wildest pretenses of the 1930's.

For an Understanding of the

Requirements of Progress

Awarded to the Daily Cardinal student newspaper of the University of Wisconsin, for its recent editorial, "Radicalism, A Dying Phenomenon":

The spirit of radicalism is dying. That became painfully evident last night with the announcement that the Labor Youth League (LYL) has finally succumbed to the combined pressures of the American Legion, university refusal to accept its officers and lack of membership.

It seems likely that the third reason is the strongest.

. . . For the present at least the spirit of radicalism has died on the campus. Unfortunately, however, real progress has usually been made by society at the insistence of strong radical elements within it. Those radical elements once had their home on the campus. Gradually, as life for radicals became more and more difficult, they retreated toward universities. Finally the universities became the last refuge for them. Now they have been forced out here too.

WHAT NEXT?

For Keeness and Wit

Awarded to Professor Robert A. Dahl, of the Political Science Department of Yale University, for his hilarious letter to the Yale Daily News on Nixon:

To the Chairman of the News:
I am somewhat puzzled . . . as to how anyone can know what Mr. Nixon is today or what he is likely to be tomorrow. What we seem to have today is Richard Nixon playing a new and not unattractive role of the Sincere Young Republican of Understanding and Purpose. In order to economize on your space and my time,

may I simply refer to this young man as S.Y.R.U.P.—Nixon?

. . . This great variety of roles ostensibly played by someone named Richard Nixon can only be explained, in my view, by one of three hypotheses, which I should now like to share with you and your readers.

First Hypothesis: Richard Nixon does indeed exist, but his real name is not Richard Nixon. The man is really one of the great actors of our time . . . Has anyone actually seen Charlie Chaplin in the last few years? . . .

Second Hypothesis: Richard Nixon does not exist. Six or seven different people exist, all acting under the same name.

. . . Third Hypothesis: Richard Nixon doesn't exist. S.Y.R.U.P.—Nixon doesn't exist. Chaplin-Nixon doesn't exist, nor does California-Nixon or any other Nixon. What we know as Richard Nixon is actually an electronic brain in a Brooks Brothers suit. . .

ROBERT A. DAHL

For a Sense of the Interrelatedness of Things

Awarded to Professor James Holly Hanford, for his footnote to Milton's "Comus," p. 129, line 768 ff, from *The Poems of John Milton*, New York: The Ronald Press Company, edited by Professor Hanford:

If every just man that now pines
with want
Had but a moderate and beaming
share
Of that which lewdly-pampered
Luxury
Now heaps upon some few with
vast excess,
Nature's full blessing would be
well dispensed
In unsuperfluous even proportion, . . .

Professor Hanford's note:

The . . . argument anticipates one of the leading contentions of modern socialism. Shakespeare has in mind the same idea when he puts into Gloucester's mouth a prayer that heaven deal quickly with "The superfluous and lust-dieted man":

"So distribution should undo excess,
And each man have enough."
(*King Lear*, IV, i, 73-74)

For Vision

Awarded to Mr. T. M. Stinnett, secretary of the National Education Association's Commission on Teacher Education, for stating that within twenty years college education will be both "free and compulsory."

ARTS and MANNERS

WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM

The Apple Cart

The most fascinating thought to hit me during Mr. Maurice Evans' recent production of G. B. Shaw's *The Apple Cart* was a crack overheard in the intermission. "Who," said one elderly gentleman to another, "who will they say a few hundred years from now wrote Shaw's plays?"

Now I am not at all sure that a few hundred years from now they will care. But, if they do, they might easily assume that what are known as Shaw's plays are actually tape recordings of accidental conversation in a café. Nobody could think it bar conversation because it isn't spirited enough for that. In a café, on the other hand, people do ooze the Shaw sort of thing—the philosophically shallow statement with the nervous surface brilliance of facile wit. Newspapermen in particular are widely known for that kind of skin-deep sophistication, and I can remember café conversations with tired writers in Paris and Vienna that were funnier, and far more competent philosophically, than any of Shaw's monologues.

The Apple Cart in particular will most certainly not be used as evidence, in 2250, that Shaw's plays were written by whoever will then be acknowledged as the Bacon of our day. In fact, it will be hardly believable that it was written by Shaw. And yet I would recommend *The Apple Cart* to anybody who seeks a fair assessment of George Bernard Shaw's talents. This play, it seems to me, defines the author.

It confronts a British king of the future with a Cabinet of democratic politicians who, in addition to being rascals, are of course dopes. The king, a king of a man, outwits all of them, his wife, his mistress, himself, the United States, and George Bernard Shaw. (Needless to say, he is played by Mr. Maurice Evans, who is a fatal trifle too cute.)

The terrible news is not so much that a whole evening passes without producing a smile on an intelligent face, as that the man who wrote this

amateurish play must have been a *petit-bourgeois* of a bore. *The Apple Cart* is an exhibition of all the flat prejudices, all the contorted resentments, all the sour platitudes a certified common man is liable to utter in the course of his dull life. The amazing fact about *The Apple Cart* is its excruciating banality.

With any other name on it, the script wouldn't have passed a producer's first reader. As a genuine Shaw, it has received a professional performance, and the audience is well-behaved enough to applaud whenever it thinks Shaw meant to be witty. I felt an urge to tell those nice people that they were being abused by a phony reputation. But, being a congenital coward, I quietly left the theater.

Around the World in 80 Days

Never have I seen an insanely large sum of money so intelligently spent as in *Around the World in Eighty Days*. The producer, Mr. Michael Todd, allegedly paid seven million dollars for this strip of film, but he now owns a toy to end all toys.

Those who read their Jules Verne when their minds were still eager will remember the magnificent story with tenderness: how that cool sport of an Englishman, on the spur of a whimsical bet, undertook, in the eighties, to circle the globe in eighty days; and how he did exactly this in spite of ordeals, predicaments and perils by which Jules Verne, in addition to anticipating so many other gadgets, pre-empted the suspense technique of the film serial.

The plot, as can be easily seen, is a white elephant. That is, there is so much of it that it just doesn't count. Therefore, a well-advised showman will pay but little attention to the plot and will focus all his care on the minute detail. This is precisely what Mr. Todd has done. The result is an evening of delicate enchantment, of innocent gaiety, of good taste, and even better fun.

When I qualify my enthusiasm to file an anguished protest against the

first few minutes of the feast—Mr. Edgar R. Murrow pompously introducing Jules Verne—I am not, I assure you, letting my private feelings about Mr. Murrow get hold of my judgment. These first few minutes would pain me even if Mr. Murrow were a charter admirer of Joe McCarthy. The opening is a bum idea simply because it is jarringly out of tune with the playful spirit of everything that follows. Mr. Murrow's throbbing baritone, so befitting his usual messages of dandyism and doom, goes with this serene spectacle about as well as an undertaker with a wedding.

Everybody else, however, is well cast. Cantinflas, the Mexican comedian who had to be world-famous before Hollywood discovered him, will soon succeed Mr. Charles Chaplin as the subject of existentialist criticism in *avant garde* magazines; but he is funny. (The trick that catapults an entertainer into *avant garde* profundity is to put patches on his baggy pants. This dependably endears him to our upper-income critics and secures his place in symbolism.)

Around the World in Eighty Days lasts more than three hours and contains no message whatsoever, unless you consider it a message that the world is big and the girls are pretty. To mention just the better-known actors strewn across the picture would take another column: Mr. Todd, absolutely determined to get rid of at least seven million dollars, hired Marlene Dietrich and Bea Lillie as extras, and a pixilated conductor on an Indian-raided train turns out to be none other than Buster Keaton. It's that kind of picture.

Where we can possibly go from here, I do not know. To outdo or even match the lure of this picture, a next one will have to present closeups of the universe or, perhaps, stunning trick shots of man's soul. Mr. Todd's picture has reached the peak. Among the many records it breaks is box office: *Variety* predicts that it will ultimately gross \$75 million. Not only can I believe this; I approve of it. Mr. Todd, I am afraid, will later on waste his stately profits on producing Tennessee Williams, Clifford Odets, and that kind of thing; for such are the size and the shape of Broadway's inferiority complexes. Just so, I am happy with the rare opportunity of applauding a popular success.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

A Major Windfall

WILLMOORE KENDALL

This reviewer thought he knew what this book (*Freedom in Contemporary Society*, by Samuel Eliot Morison, Little, Brown, \$3.50) was going to say before he read a word of it. The author is Professor Emeritus of American History at Harvard, the former collaborator of Henry Steele Commager, and the World War Two historian of the stuffiest and most respectable branch of our armed services. He is, in a word, a man not renowned for the fusses he has kicked up with the Establishment, and not likely, therefore, in writing on political, economic, and academic freedom, to rise above what might be called the Zechariah Chafee level of penetration and originality.

And sure enough, Admiral Morison talks of our "great peril," of our liberties that are about to be subverted "at the hands of foolish and wicked Americans—by whom I do not mean those commonly called 'fellow travelers.'" He refers to that "obscene" phenomenon known as McCarthyism. The TVA, we learn under the topic of "Economic Freedom," is the "greatest constructive and permanent achievement of the New Deal," and the latter, let there be no question about it, "saved the capitalist system . . . and democratic government as well." The Great Depression "discredited *laissez faire*, a resort to which, now, is even less likely than a return to neolithic civilization following an atomic war"—which seems to put the familiar relax-and-enjoy-statism theme as forcefully as the Establishment could wish. And on "academic freedom" we hear, as we expected to, about those "frightened conservatives" who are attacking our colleges as centers of Communism.

I could, I suppose, cite some further examples of the kind of thing I expected to find in *Freedom in Contemporary Society*; but I am not going to because it has been mighty hard work turning up the ones I've just given you, and because the time has come to confess: I couldn't have been more wrong about Professor Morison's book. Though no great shakes as political theory, it has more good sense in it about freedom, especially academic freedom, than anything I've read—from within the Establishment or from outside it—in recent years, and is, because of the esteem in which its author is held, a major windfall for those of us who have

been trying to raise a little hell with the civil libertarians, the academic freedomites, the all-questions-are-open-questions characters, and, above all, those who suppose that American society can cut itself off from its religious basis and yet remain decent and viable. For it is a book by a man of courage and conviction, conservative conviction furthermore, who sees political and social life with the innocent and accurate eye of a child. But that, as Gerhart Niemeyer reminded us recently, is conservative too.

For one thing, when he writes "economic freedom" Professor Morison means not "security" or "equality" or "industrial democracy" but, simply, *freedom*: "freedom to choose your profession or occupation, free competition at all levels, freedom to grow rich or go broke, freedom to make all the profit you can, acquire a fortune, and to bequeath or inherit said fortune." Moreover, he's for that kind of economic freedom, thinks it will

survive just about to the extent that we as a nation retain "character and wisdom," and—a note that this reviewer has been waiting for someone to strike for a long time—believes we have lost a lot less of it than our pundits would like us to think. He estimates the proportion we've kept at 79 per cent, and concludes: "Free enterprise, like Mark Twain, may remark that the rumor of its death is exaggerated." And he knows who in American society are the true enemies of free enterprise: "The unions have battled their way so successfully that their members have become the privileged class . . . comparable to the *rentier* of the nineteenth century." And, back to that point about "character and wisdom," he lays it on the line about the relation between religion and liberty: "Only a Christian commonwealth is capable of preserving freedom; and without freedom nothing in what we call civilization is worth preserving."

Secondly, Professor Morison believes in natural law and believes that natural law is divine law, and remembers (and reminds us at every turn) that our natural rights derive from our natural duties, rather than the other way round. For no emphasis in the political theory we normally get these days from the Liberals is so confusing as its failure to recognize that the man who does not perform his duties thereby divests himself of his rights.

Thirdly, his views on academic freedom and Communism reflect throughout that profound conception of rights and duties; with the result that he says all the things that, in those areas, need saying in a book on liberty. Academic freedom, he writes, "is but one of the many freedoms that come from God, who gave us our minds that we might rise a little nearer the angels; and without whose grace we are powerless for good." It is, however, a freedom that "must be exercised in a framework of academic discipline, which includes good manners, good taste and a

decent respect for the opinions of the non-academic world." Those who are concerned about the future of academic freedom, he insists further, should fear neither the Reds nor the Red-baiters, but "the attempts of professional 'educators' to control higher education," and "the general mediocrity of the teaching profession." As for the Communists, they "are not entitled to civil rights, so long as they deny them to others," and that, he adds in effect, goes for "Communists on college faculties" and for Communists in organized research. "The scientific community has too much taken for granted that a scientist's political and social beliefs are irrelevant to his professional competence. [They are] . . . under the impression that these matters of belief were nobody's business. They had better make it their business. . . ."

Our big problem, in short, is the *trahison des clercs*, and the relevant question, Professor Morison is saying, is not, How much academic freedom ought people as a matter of course to have, but how much have they deserved? The answer, he makes clear, might be: none at all.

This is one I'd say to go read for yourself. It's that exciting.

Open-Shut Policy

Freedom or Secrecy, by James Russell Wiggins. 242 pp. New York: Oxford University Press. \$4.00

Mr. James Russell Wiggins, executive editor of the *Washington Post*, believes that the people have a right to know more about public affairs than current laws and regulations permit them to know. This, at any rate, is the contention of *Freedom or Secrecy*, and who is to gainsay the sincerity of the man who once put up \$1,000 to keep Paul Hughes in groceries, on behalf of the public's "right to know" about the alleged perfidy of the McCarthy Committee?

Dullness aside, the book is doctrinaire in failing to discriminate between those secrecy practices that hurt little, or not at all, and those that present a threat to free society. Mr. Wiggins is quite as disturbed when the public is kept out of the courtroom during a sex trial as when the public is kept in the dark about affairs of state.

And what disturbs him in the latter category is withholding from the public information about congressional retirement benefits.

The explanation for Mr. Wiggins' failure to get his teeth into his subject may be that most of the real outrages against the public's "right to know"—such as the East-West trade blackout last spring—are perpetrated on behalf of policies the Liberals favor. In any event, the chief reason we have lost ground to government secrecy in the past is that Mr. Wiggins and his fellow servants in the Liberal press have always kept their mouths shut when they ought to have been yelling the loudest.

L. BRENT BOZELL

Arab Thunder

The Middle East: Its Religion and Culture, by Edward J. Jurji. 159 pp. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. \$3.00

The Crescent in Crisis, by Nabih Amin Faris and Mohammed Tawfik Husayn. 191 pp. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. \$4.00

Both of these books are designed to present to American readers the views of the "Arab" world. Both state quite clearly that the establishment of the state of Israel was an act of unprincipled aggression for which the United States must bear the full moral responsibility. But whereas Mr. Jurji is evidently willing to accept a *fait accompli* as a basis for possible peace, the younger writers roundly declare that "Israel stands as a spear stuck into the heart of the Arab fatherland," and predict that it will soon be plucked out.

Mr. Jurji, who has written the more readable book, sees the problem as essentially cultural, an antagonism between three religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, that has been exacerbated by two intrusive and anti-religious forces, Zionism and Communism. The three religions spring from a common source and worship the same God. As in the famous parable of the three rings in Boccaccio, therefore, Jews, Christians and Moslems must recognize that they are all children of the same father, who loves them equally. Let them, then, unite in reciprocal

toleration "so that, loving each other in faith and in truth . . . we might [sic] together build a better world."

Messrs. Faris and Husayn, who write an English that will frequently remind high-school teachers of themes by freshmen, are primarily interested in politics and economics. Although they admit that the "awakening" of the Middle East was caused by "Western propaganda [which] was very active in preaching democracy, social justice, and the right of all peoples in self-determination," they insist that the West must pay for its folly by withdrawing promptly and completely from the lands that it has "exploited." England, France, and the United States are now being stripped of their ill-gotten protectorates, canals, air bases and oil fields. As soon as the Arab fatherland can complete its assimilation of modern technology, the West will be well advised to tremble before a revival of the Abbasid Empire, a rich, populous, and united Islam extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf. Whether they hope eventually to reverse the results of the battles of Tours and Vienna, the authors do not say.

REVILO OLIVER

The Untangled Story

The Enemy at His Back, by Elizabeth Churchill Brown. 234 pp. New York: A Free Enterprise Publication distributed by The Bookmailer. \$4.00

This is a painstaking effort to correlate in a brief, straightforward form the massive body of evidence available in congressional hearings, in memoirs, and reportage. The task Mrs. Brown set herself was one to make the most experienced political research scholar blanch; and she had had no previous experience in this field. She has succeeded remarkably well.

I am reasonably familiar with the material; I have read many of the memoirs and I have used the Committee prints. But again and again Mrs. Brown, by the parallel quotation of several sources, clarifies questions that have been puzzling me for years. Moreover, the book is so constructed that it will be valuable to anyone interested in the tangled story of

Communist influence over these years, whether he has little or no previous knowledge of the sources, or a great deal. Mrs. Brown has used the device of placing all her references in the margin, so that the flow of her narrative is never interrupted, yet those who are primarily interested in the correlation of the sources can easily make quick reference.

General Wedemeyer has written that this book is "one of the clearest and most factual expositions of Communist influence on American foreign policies and actions that I have read." To this I would add that Mrs. Brown's insight into the modes of operation of the Communists in this field is as excellent as her descriptive narrative.

FRANK S. MEYER

Tale of Torture

Red Dragon over China, by Harold H. Martinson. 328 pp. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House. \$3.50

The Red Dragon in Mr. Martinson's title is, of course, Chinese Communism. But further justification for his title the author finds in this quotation from the Book of Revelations: "And another portent appeared in heaven: behold, a great red dragon—that ancient serpent who is called the Devil and Satan, the deceiver of the whole world."

Mr. Martinson, a Lutheran minister, was for many years a missionary in China. All missionaries worthy of their keep "go Chinese." Mr. Martinson was even born in China, in the province of Honan, the heart of ancient, indeed, of prehistoric China.

The book that this exile from China has written is in two parts. Almost exactly half of *Red Dragon over China* is given to the birth, development and triumph of the Communist movement in China, the second half to what might be called "testimonials." One gathers that all of these sixteen short chapters are reports on the recitals of Occidental and Chinese escapees from the Red hell, whom the author interviewed in Hongkong.

Mr. Martinson's history of the Communist conquest of the Chinese mainland (in the course of which he does not spare U.S. policy), is a painstaking job. This reviewer, who

saw the beginnings of the Red movement at very short range and has read all that came his way about it since 1919, finds the few errors in it trifling and inconsequential. Anyone who wants to know how Chinese Communism won control over China can get that story in the first 162 pages of this book.

The last sixteen chapters are nearly all ghastly stories of sadistic torture, ranging from day-long, night-long interrogations, for days, weeks and months, to physical atrocities. All are infuriating, but none more so than the treatment accorded a young Belgian priest, Father A. Sohier, from which he emerged covered with scars and lumps, his back broken, and with tubercular lungs and spine. The reader who knows the Chinese people would conclude that the victim had fallen into the hands of an insane local criminal. But these stories come from all parts of China, and the pattern of tortures is the same everywhere. Torture, in short, is the implementation of the Red regime's official policy.

RODNEY GILBERT

Titoist Mirage

The Big Thaw, by C. L. Sulzberger. 275 pp. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$4.00

In spite of the ponderous blurbs with which the publishers have loaded its jacket, this is actually—except for a soundoff in the final chapter—a modest book. It collects a number of articles, previously published in the *New York Times*, in which Mr. Sulzberger reports on his recent trips to Russia and the East European captive nations. As day-by-day journalism they are competent and pleasant.

Mr. Sulzberger is best when reporting what he has directly observed—the youthful Soviet "jet set," the Red Square's new department store, Cominform headquarters in "drab and earnest" Bucharest, Carlsbad (now Karlovy Vary) as a watering place for the Communist elite. When "interpreting," he is rather superficial, and, as is customary with the *Times'* approach to reality, too generous toward official handouts. He accepts the statistics of Soviet achievement as sound coin, and too readily treats

a warm tactical smile from a bureaucrat as symptom of a major thaw in the Soviet iceberg.

Mr. Sulzberger would have done well to keep to his journalistic boulevard. He could not resist a prophetic bypass, along which he feverishly chases the Titoist mirage.

The epidemic Titophilia in this country is a phenomenon not yet sufficiently studied. In terms of tactics, it is plausible that Americans should have this or that opinion on what to do about Titoism: what degree and mode of practical support or opposition, in relation to the total international problem. But it is beyond easy comprehension why so many of our leading verbalists seem to put a positive value on Tito and Titoism in and for their own sake, to swallow them like a piece of delicious candy instead of a bitter if momentarily necessary pill.

Mr. Sulzberger has pieced together his current ideology out of scraps from Walter Lippmann and Hamilton Fish Armstrong, pasted together with Yugoslav propaganda.

The greatest fault of our satellite policy, both as announced and applied, is that it has not concentrated upon the attainable. It has persistently worked for what is patently impossible except in the event of the war that we ourselves rule out. But there is a realizable goal. That is Titoism. . . . Encouraging Titoism's spread in Eastern Europe would be for ourselves a policy of heads I win, tails you lose.

Ten days before this book's publication date, the Hungarian people made what should be a conclusive criticism of this central thesis.

JAMES BURNHAM

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To the Editor

Suez

F. A. VOIGT

(Con't from p. 11)

The Polish Situation

"The Kremlin and the Poles" [Nov. 3], bristling with unmistakable signs of haste, recommends "foodstuffs, loans and credits" to the totalitarian Marxist regime of "the Stalin of Poland," Mr. W. Gomulka. To be sure, this recommendation is conditional. The Communist government in Warsaw, it is emphasized, must "move away from Moscow, in deed and not merely in slogan . . ." Why not spell out, in capital letters, that this new orientation would require, not only the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops, tanks and mortars, but also definite adherence to the target date, December 16, 1956, "promise" of "free elections." Apparently, the editors of NATIONAL REVIEW have momentarily forgotten what they have frequently proclaimed: 1) Every totalitarian Marxist is a conspirator; 2) Every Leninist is a prevaricator; and 3) Every Communist is a criminal.

As to the possible "attack on Poland by the Soviet Army," all students of Kremlin tactics should know that the Soviets had hoped to take over the free world without firing a shot. . . . Persuaded by . . . Tito at Brioni and Yalta, the Moscow Politburo agreed to substitute one set of Marxist Gauleiters for another. Indeed, there are indications that the first team was substituted for the second-stringers. The "booby trap" backfired in Budapest. This was a fatal accident. . . .

REV. DR. JOSEPH F. THORNING
Professor in the Catholic
University of Chile

Frederick, Md.

No Peace

. . . The Motto "Peace and Prosperity" is false for there is no peace in the world. . . . Thirty-four thousand American boys lie in the soil of Korea in those snow-clad hills and no one knows how many American boys are held in Red prisons and no one seems to care. All of that gallant effort by Dr. Rhee and his people has gone for nothing . . . The UN pledged that Korea would be free and united and we the U.S. pledged that Nationalist

China would be set free, and all of this is in vain.

. . . The people in Hungary are fighting with desperate valor to free themselves from . . . the Red Empire which was founded upon brute force and has used the whip lash of fear to keep her people under the yoke of slavery.

Under these conditions to talk of peace is mockery. . . . It is said every day that I should vote. Why? . . . Three times I wore the uniform of a combat soldier and I will not be compelled to vote or support anything in which I do not believe.

Canton, N.Y.

C. H. MACVEY

Least Common Denominator

. . . Your stand on the Suez Canal issue seems to have brought a considerable number of protests. I hope you will not be too much influenced by conflicting opinions of readers, but will continue to "be yourself." . . . As I see it, the best you can do, as a journal of conservative opinion, is to try to seek the least common denominator of true liberalism. As for subsidiary issues, let the chips fall where they may.

Tucson, Ariz.

BELA HUBBARD

Eerie Business

Your editorial "Paradise Lost. A Priori." [Nov. 10], dealing with one of the eeriest subjects ever seen on an editorial page, has now provoked one of the eeriest letters to the editor ever written.

Speaking from the experience which the psychiatric profession has inadvertently afforded me and a few hundred thousand others to leave this cruel world, I would say it is exactly their a priori assumptions which confuse the scientists on this matter of eternal life. To attempt to gain eternity by adding one lifetime to another ad infinitum is a laborious and never-ending process. Eternity is very easily achieved by the subtraction of time. Dr. Kubie and his colleagues have already achieved this a couple of million times on the shock tables. It is earlier than they think.

Pelham, N.Y.

ARTHUR EGAN

no doubt, have led to a signal victory by Israel. But the victory could not have been final. All the Arab states would have been drawn in, and even if Israel had advanced from victory to victory, she would in the end have fought to the point of exhaustion. There might have been a Middle Eastern Thirty Years' War, except that Russia would not have waited thirty years. She would have judged her time, intervened (whether on the side of the Arab states or on the side of Israel, no one can tell), and imposed peace—a peace which would have left her the master.

Nothing but a nuclear war could then have dislodged her. Only action of the kind now undertaken by France and Great Britain can avert the catastrophe—at least, no one seems able to suggest any other course that could conceivably do so. For once the phrase, "fighting for peace," so misused and over-used, and so tainted by false sentiment and pharisaical posturing, happens to be true. France and Great Britain are securing for themselves and for the whole Atlantic Alliance a vital strategic position and are, at the same time, stopping a war by keeping the main forces of the combatants apart.

Some critics of the British Government maintain that action should have been taken much sooner—as soon as Egypt nationalized the Canal or, at the latest, when the proposals of the eighteen powers were submitted to Colonel Nasser. That would have been the time, so these critics aver, for an ultimatum. The failure to take action then convinced many observers that the Canal Zone and the Canal and the whole of the Middle East would be lost. The action now taken belatedly but not too late (if it is successful) has dispelled this conviction.

Those who cannot provide an alternative—and inaction, negotiation, and the United Nations are no alternatives—must, if they are acquainted with the realities of the situation and do not desire the ultimate triumph of Communism, wish that the enterprise in which Great Britain and France are now engaged be attended with swift and complete success.




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
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